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KELSA Y V. MOTOROLA, INC.

TORT ACTION FOR
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE UPON
FILING WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION CLAIMS
This doctrine of retaliation--eye for eye, tooth for tooth-is that
which has been termed the right of self-revenge: it is this right
alone which many suppose a man relinquishes when he enters into
a state of social life. But I trust it will be acknowledged, that, we as
rational human beings, never enjoyed this right, or rather that
there is no such right, in a state of nature, and of course we have it
not to relinquish.'
The surge of the Industrial Revolution at the turn of the
twentieth century burgeoned into a shower of prosperity for
America and, concomitantly, an increase in industrial casualties. Subject to severe limitations, 2 the courts recognized a
worker's right to sue his employer for injuries received in the
course of employment. The "unholy trinity ' 3 of defenses available to an employer-assumption of risk, contributory negligence and negligence of a fellow-servant--often precluded an
employee's recovery. 4 This resulted in state legislators moving
to adopt Workmen's Compensation Acts. Illinois approved such
an act in 1911, 5 to ensure compensation to employees for their
work-related injuries. 6 In exchange for a comprehensive sched1. J.M. GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES AND MAX26 (1819).
2. Eason, Workmen's Compensation-1974 What the Future Holds, 10
ILL. L.F. 145, 146-47 (1974).
3. W. PROSSER, TORTs § 80, at 526-27 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
IMS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

PROSSER].

4. Id.. See also Schmidt & German, Employer Misconduct as Affecting
the Exclusiveness of Workmen's Compensation, 18 U. Prrr. L. REV. 81, 81
(1956); 1 T. ANGERSTEIN, ILLINOIS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1, 1 (1952)
[hereinafter cited as ANGERSTEIN].
5. This Act went into effect May 1, 1912. It was repealed and replaced
by another Act in 1913. Since 1913, the various amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act have become so numerous as to preclude discussion here.
6. The Illinois Supreme Court has stated:
The primary purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to provide
employees prompt, sure, and definite compensation, together with a
quick and efficient remedy for injuries or death suffered by such employees in the course of their employment... and to require the cost of
such injuries to be borne by the industry itself and not by its individual
members.
O'Brien v. Rautenbush, 10 1l. 2d 167, 173, 139 N.E.2d 222, 226 (1956).
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ule of injuries and their respective values, an employee relinquished the common law right to sue his employer in tort for his

injuries.

7

The master-servant doctrine of terminable-at-will employ-

ment was introduced in America almost contemporaneously
with the adoption of the Workmen's Compensation Acts. 8 This

doctrine afforded employers the absolute right to discharge their
employees when the employment relationship was of no set duration. Supported by laissez-faire capitalism, the doctrine flourished to the extent that it was afforded constitutional protection
by the United States Supreme Court.9 Illinois adopted the terminable-at-will doctrine in 1908.10
Exceptions to this absolute right of discharge, however,
have been carved out over the years, both on the federal1 ' and
7. Grand Truck W. Ry. v. Industrial Comm'n, 291 Ill.
167 (1920); Leach
v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill.
App. 3d 1022, 1025, 366 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (1977);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8-145 (1977).
8. Apparently, this was the creation of a writer who cites as authority
four cases, none of which supported him. H.G. Wood wrote in his 1877 treatise on the law of master and servant that:
With us (contrary to English law) the rule is inflexible that a general or
indefinite hiring is primafacie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks
to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is on him to establish it by
proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being
specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it
was for a day even, but only at a date fixed for whatever time the party
may serve.
H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272
(1877). Despite the lack of authority, courts readily adopted the doctrine.
See, e.g., The Pokanoket, 156 F. 241, 24344 (4th Cir. 1907); Greer v. Arlington
Mills Mfg. Co., 17 Del. 581, 582-83, 43 A. 609, 610-12 (Super. Ct. 1899); McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 557-59, 11 A. 176, 178-79 (1887); Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121, 42 N.E. 416, 417 (1895). See
also Summers, IndividualProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time/or a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Summers].
9. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908), wherein the Court
rationalized that "the right of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for
whatever reason, to dispense with the services of such employee." See also
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), where the Court held that employers
had a constitutional right to discharge employees arbitrarily, and invalidated a Kansas statute to the contrary, as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
10. Brougham v. Paul, 138 ELI.App. 455, 464 (1908). See also Roemer v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 25 Ill.
App. 2d 606, 323 N.E.2d 582 (1975), holding that there is
no legal remedy for an at-will employee in an action based on breach of
contract even when the discharge is improperly motivated. See also I.L.P.
Employment § 26 (1956).
11. E.g., Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 459(b) (1970)
(an employee has a statutory right to job reinstatement upon returning to
civilian life); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 & Supp.
1974-78); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.. § 151-68 (1970) (guarantees
to employees the right to form unions and engage in collective bargaining
without fear of employer retaliation).
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state 12 levels. One exception to the rule is recognized when the
employer discharges the employee in retaliation for certain proscribed conduct.' 3 Recently, the retaliatory discharge exception
has been extended to instances where an employee is disclaim for injuries
charged for filing a Workmen's Compensation
14
received in the course of employment.
12. E.g., Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
48, § 39.11 (1977); Service Men's Employment Tenure Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
126-1/2, § 29-35 (1977); Fair Employment Practices Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
§ 85 (1977); and Equal Opportunity for the Handicapped, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, §§ 65-23, 65-25 (1977).
13. See notes 45-47, 54-58 and accompanying text infra.
14. Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977)
(recognizing a cause of action, and presumably affirmed by Kelsay);
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (the landmark
decision in this area, recognizing for the first time in the United States that
a cause of action exists for retaliatory discharge in the workmen's compensation area); Sventko v: Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976)
(citing Frampton as sole support for recognizing a cause of action).
However, several earlier cases have been reported holding that no
cause of action may be maintained for retaliatory discharge. The first, Raley
v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950), cited no
authorities. Raley appears to have been decided on the basis that a complaint for discharge, in order to be actionable, must be framed in terms of
breach of contract. Furthermore, the Raley court found no invasion of the
plaintiffs legal rights. Even though she had lost her job, the plaintiff was
able to successfully maintain her workmen's compensation claim. Thus,
the plaintiff, as an at-will employee, was held to be subject to discharge at
any time; the employer was found to have properly exercised his absolute
right to discharge an at-will employee. In Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295
S.W.2d 122 (1956), the Missouri Supreme Court interpreted a statute similar
to that of Illinois, see note 25 infra, providing for the imposition of criminal
liability upon employers who discharged employees for exercising their
rights to file claims for work-related injuries. In interpreting Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 287.780 (1949), which provided as follows:
[e]very employer, his director, officer or agent, who discharges or in
any way discriminates against an employee for exercising any of his
rights under this chapter, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty
nor more than five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county
jail for not less than one week nor more than one year, or by both such
fine and imprisonment[,J
the court held that no provision was included placing an affirmative duty
upon the employer. Moreover, criminal statutes which did not by clear and
express terms allow for a civil action, would not be otherwise construed.
Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956). Since the decision in
Christy, however, the Missouri legislature has amended that provisiork so
that a civil cause of action for discharge is now available. Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 287.780 (1979); See also Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.
1977) (the Kelsay court refused to follow the Seventh Circuit's decision in
the retaliatory discharge question); Narens v. Campbell Sixty-Six Express,
Inc., 347 S.W.2d 204 (Mo. 1961) (citing Christy); Texas Steel Co. v. Douglas,
553 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (citing a state statute providing a cause
of action).
Most recently, the Alabama Supreme Court has refused to recognize a
cause of action for retaliatory discharge in the workmen's compensation
area. In Martin v. Tapley, 360 So.2d 708 (Ala. 1978) the court relied only on
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The Illinois Supreme Court resolved the conflict between
the employer's absolute right of discharge and the employee's
right to file a Workmen's Compensation claim in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.15 This note deals with the conflict of retaliatory discharge as presented for the first time in Illinois. Should a cause
of action for retaliatory discharge be recognized? If so, is such
an action one in which punitive damages should be awarded,
and further, should punitive damages have been awarded to the
16
Kelsay plaintiff?
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Marilyn Kelsay, an at-will employee of Motorola, was injured in the course of her employment and filed a Workmen's
Compensation claim.' 7 A Motorola personnel manager informed her that the claim was unnecessary and she was asked
to withdraw it. In subsequent conversations, the manager informed her of the company's policy to discharge employees who
filed such claims. Upon her continued refusal to withdraw the
claim, she was fired. 18 Kelsay filed a tort action against her employer for the discharge, and sought compensatory and punitive
damages. The trial court granted Kelsay's motion for directed
verdict as to liability for the discharge. The jury found actual
damages in the amount of $1,000.00 and punitive damages in the
amount of $25,000.00.19 Motorola appealed to the Fourth District
Appellate Court. That court, with one judge dissenting, reAlabama precedent, and held that even in the presence of compelling public
policy grounds the terminable-at-will doctrine should not be eroded. Similarly, in Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 N.E.2d 272
(1978), cert. denied, 246 S.E.2d 215, no cause of action was allowed. Nor was
one allowed in Stephens v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So. 2d 510 (La. Ct.
App. 1975).
15. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
16. Id. at 179, 384 N.E.2d at 356.
17. Brief for Appellant at 7, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 11l. 2d 172, 384

N.E.2d 353 (1978). The testimony of the personnel manager for Motorola
indicated that his understanding of the company policy was the result of
conversations with his immediate supervisors. It was an unwritten practice
of Motorola to discharge an employee who failed to relinquish a claim filed
for workmen's compensation benefits. The successor to that manager indicated during testimony that "the only policy of Motorola with respect to
employees filing workmen's compensation claims was to take care of them."

Brief for Appellant at 7, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 111. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1978).

18. Id.
19. The jury was presented with a verdict form which required it to
award actual damages. The option of awarding punitive damages was left to
the jury, which elected to award them. The court remitted the actual damages to $745.00. Brief for Appellant at 8, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 M. 2d
172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). See notes 100-08 and accompanying text infra for
discussion of damages.
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versed the judgment, and held that Kelsay's complaint failed to
state a cause of action. 20 Because a different panel of the same
court reached a contrary result in an opinion filed on the same
date,2 1 the appellate court, on its own motion, issued a certificate
of importance 2 2 to the Illinois Supreme Court.
THE DECISION OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

In support of its decision to recognize a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on
neither state precedent, analogies, nor statutory applications.
Rather, the court proclaimed that recognition of such an action
was in furtherance of the state's public policy. 23 That policy was
inferred from the general purpose and function of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court reasoned that the refusal to.
grant employees the right to sue their ex-employers for retaliatory discharge would undermine the Act's purpose. Without
such a remedy, employees would be forced to forego exercising
24
their statutory right to fie claims in order to keep their jobs.
The Illinois General Assembly enacted a statute which made retaliatory discharge for filing compensation claims a criminal offense.25 Motorola could not be subjected to that statute because
26
it discharged Kelsay prior to the statute's effective date.
In determining that a cause of action for retaliatory discharge would henceforth be recognized in Illinois, the supreme
court held that compensatory damages were properly awarded
20. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 366 N.E.2d 1141 (1977).
21. The opinion in Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366
N.E.2d 1145 (1977), recognizing a cause of action was filed on the same day
as the appellate opinion in Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 366
N.E.2d 1141 (1977) (refusing to recognize a cause of action).
22. The Illinois Supreme Court Rule 316, titled "Appeals from Appellate
Court to Supreme Court on Certificate" provides in part as follows: "Appeals from the Appellate Court shall lie to the Supreme Court upon the
certification by a division of the Appellate Court that a case decided by it
involves a question of such importance that it should be decided by the
Supreme Court. . .

."

58 Ill. 2d R. 316 (1975).

23. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d at 181, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
24. See generally Note, A Right to Workmen's Compensation-Dangling
of the Economic Apple?, 6 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 465 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as A Right to Workmen's Compensation].
25. Kelsay was fired in 1973. Illinois enacted a criminal provision in the
Workmen's Compensation Act with respect to discharges to be effective
July 1, 1975:
It shall be unlawful for any employer, individually or through any insurance company or service or adjustment company, to discharge or to
threaten to discharge, or to refuse to rehire or recall to active service in
a suitable capacity an employee because of the exercise of his rights or
remedies granted to him by this Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4(h) (1977).
26. Id.
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to the plaintiff. However, the court refused to uphold the award
of punitive damages in the instant case. Due to the novelty of
the action, exemplary damages were to be granted only in ac27
tions subsequent to Kelsay.
The dissent maintained that the majority's decision usurped
the function of the General Assembly. Criminal sanctions had
been provided. Because the General Assembly had refrained
from providing a civil action, the dissent reasoned, so should the
2 8

courts.

BACKGROUND

History of the Terminable-At-Will Doctrine
Master and servant law reflects the kaleidoscopic change of
American economic thought more explicitly than any other facet
of the law. As previously mentioned, the evolution of the terminable-at-will doctrine was based upon the deeply rooted laissezfaire convictions of American society.29 The late nineteenth
century was a period of job abundance and labor scarcity, 30 as
well as fledgling entrepreneurism and business failure. 31 In order to protect and nurture industrial expansion, the courts af32
firmatively chose to shield the employer's interest.
Utilizing contract law, the courts justified in legal terms the
decision to protect those interests. 33 Employment for an indefinite term was and is not a contract per se, but rather an offer for
a series of unilateral contracts. 34 The "employee-offeree" accepts each unilateral offer through the performance of specified
tasks.35 Discharge by the "employer-offerer" constitutes with36
drawal of a revocable offer.
The employee is free to leave at will,3 7 and the employer is
27.
28.
29.
30.

Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.
2d at 189, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
Id. at 192-93, 384 N.E.2d at 363-64.
A Right to Workmen's Compensation, supra note 24, at 468.
Id. at 469.

31. E.

JOHNSON

& H.

KRoss, THE AMERICAN

COCmAN & W. MILLER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE

ECONOMY 242 (1960); T.

136 (rev. ed. 1961). See also

Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively DischargedEmployee, 26
L.J. 1435 (1975) [hereinafter cited as A Common Law Action].
32. A Common Law Action, supra note 31, at 1440.
33. Id. See also A Right to Workmen's Compensation, supra note 24, at
469; Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise ofEmployer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Blades].
HAST.

34. Blades, supra note 33, at 1418.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1419.

37. As stated in an early case:
An employee is never presumed to engage his services permanently,
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free to terminate the relationship as well, "for good cause, for no
cause, or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby
guilty of legal wrong."''
In the absence of employment contracts 3 9 and certain proscribed violations of public policy,40 the
41
terminable-at-will doctrine retains its original vitality.
The ConstitutionalRight to Discharge and its Erosion
The United States Supreme Court elevated the absolute
right of discharge to a constitutionally protected right of liberty
and property, based on the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 42 This reflected the philosophy of the
thereby cutting himself off from all chances of improving his condition;
indeed, in this land of opportunity it would be against public policy and
the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus handicap himself; and the law will presume.., that he did not so intend. And if the
contract of employment be not binding on the employee ... then it
cannot be binding upon the employer; there would be a lack of mutual-

ity.
Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 174 La. 66, 69, 139 So. 760, 761
(1932).
38. Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on
other grounds,Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915). "[T]he
labor contract is not a contract, it is a continuing renewal of a contract at
every successive moment, implied simply from the fact that the laborer
keeps at work and the employer accepts his product." J. COMMONS, LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CAPIrALISM 285 (1924).
39. Currently, nearly all contracts negotiated by unions provide that

dismissals must be "for just cause." A
supra note 24, at 471.

RIGHT TO WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-

TION,

40. See notes 14 supra and 56-58 infra.
41. See, e.g., Northrop v. Kirby, 454 F. Supp. 698 (D.C. Ala. 1978) (upon
termination of contract, employment is at-will); Griffith v. Electrolux Corp.,
454 F. Supp. 29 (D.C. Va. 1978) (reason for terminating an oral hiring of no
specified duration is immaterial; however, reasonable notice is required);
Minor v. Lakeview Hospital, 434 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (plaintiff
failed to show discriminatory nature of discharge); Uriarte v. Perez-Molina,
434 F. Supp. 76 (D.C. D.C. 1977) (no cause of action for terminable-at-will
employee); Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 891 (D.C. Pa.
1976) (no cause of action under state age discrimination statute); Larsen v.
Motor Supply Co., 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. App. 1977) (termination proper for
refusal to take "psychological stress evaluation tests"); DeMarco v. Publix
Super Markets, Inc., 360 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1978) (employer has constitutionally protected right to discharge at will); West v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta,
145 Ga. App. 808, 245 S.E.2d 46 (1978) (bank fired employee for filing bankruptcy petition); Stevenson v. 1T Harper, Inc., 51 MI1.
App. 3d 568, 366 N.E.2d
103 (1977); Laird v. Eagle Iron Works, 249 N.W.2d 646 (Iowa 1977) (absolute
right of discharge); Freeman v. Elbilco, Inc., 338 So. 2d 967 (La. 1977)
(same); Goldstein v. Kern, 82 Mich. App. 723, 267 N.W.2d 37 (1978) (same);
Stewart v. North Side Produce Co., 197 Neb. 245, 248 N.W.2d 37 (1976)
(same); Grozek v. Ragu Goods, Inc., 406 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1978) (no notice required); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978)
(public policy discussed).
42. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908). The Adair case involved a federal statute barring common carriers from discharging employees because of union membership. The Court
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early 1900's: the encouragement of industrialization and maintenance of freedom of contract. 43 This era was short-lived, however.4 In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,4 5 the Court
upheld a provision in the Wagner Act4 prohibiting, in effect, discharge of employees because of labor union membership. 47 The
growing strength of unions and recognition of the employees'
right to engage in collective bargaining helped to balance the
struck down the statute as "an arbitrary interference with the liberty of
contract which no government can legally justify in a free land." 208 U.S. at
175. Moreover the Court announced in Adair that:
It is a part of every man's civil right that he be left at liberty to refuse
business relations with any person whomsoever, whether the refusal
rests upon reason, or is the result of whim, caprice, prejudice or malice.
With his reasons neither the public nor third persons have any legal
concern. It is also his right to have business relations with any one with
whom he can make contracts, and if he is wrongfully deprived of this
right by others, he is entitled to redress.
Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. at 173, (quoting T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS
278 (1880)).
The Kansas anti-yellow-dog statute, which was struck by the Coppage
Court as an unconstitutional deprivation of the employer's property right to
"hire and fire", made it a criminal offense for employers to influence, coerce
or require employees not to join labor organizations. The Court declared
with respect to the inequalities of employer and employee that:
[S]ince it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common,
some persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of
private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate
those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. at 17. See also Rodes, Due Process and Social
Legislation in the Supreme Court-A Post Mortem, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 5
(1957).
43. The philosophy prevalent in the early twentieth century regarding
freedom of contract is succinctly stated in the early case of Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884): "May I not refuse to trade with
anyone? May I not forbid my family to trade with anyone? May I not dismiss my domestic servant for dealing, or even visiting, where I forbid? And
if my domestic, why not my farmhand, or my mechanic, or teamster?"
44. See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941)
(both impliedly overruling Adair and Coppage).
45. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
46. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1970 & Supp. IV
1974).
47. The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides
that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized. ...
48. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (a)(3) (1970).
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respective bargaining powers of employers and employees,
50
and erode the employers' right to discharge.

49

The Supreme Court, noting that problems still faced employees, 51 extended an invitation to state legislators to end arbitrary employment practices. The Court declared that states
have the power to legislate against injurious practices in internal business and commercial areas, so long as those laws do not
circumvent federal guidelines. 52 States, therefore, were prima53
rily responsible for combating arbitrary discharge practices.
State legislatures accepted the Supreme Court's invitation
by prohibiting discharges based on color, religion, national origin, sex, physical handicaps and political affiliations.54 Additionally, the state courts assumed the task of further restricting
employers' discharge policies.5 5 Applying concepts of public
49. In fact, Justice Day's dissent in Coppage predicted the change in
American philosophy with respect to the rights of the employee:
I think the act now under consideration, and kindred ones, are intended
to promote the same liberty of action for the employe (sic), as the employer confessedly enjoys. The law should be as zealous to protect the
constitutional liberty of the employe as it is to guard that of the employer. A principal object of this statute is to protect the liberty of the
citizen to make such lawful affiliation as he may desire with organizations of his choice. It should not be necessary to the protection of the
liberty of one citizen that the same right in another citizen be abridged
or destroyed.
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. at 40. Cf. 236 U.S. at 17 (majority opinion): "No
doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and will be
inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances ....
50. [U]nionization provides no protection for the individual employed in a business where the employer has successfully resisted organizing attempts. Second, unions are concerned with the interests of
the collective body, often at the expense of the individual employee
who feels that he has been wrongfully discharged. Because the union
usually maintains exclusive control over the right to utilize the grievance-arbitration machinery, a decision to sacrifice the individual's interests in return for a larger benefit for the majority may lawfully strip
the employee of job protection. Finally, the argument overlooks the
fact that many employees prefer not to be represented by labor unions.
For these individuals, it is no solution to insist that they join labor unions in order to obtain basic protection against abusive discharge.
A Common Law Action, supra note 31, at 1443-44.
51. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 536-37 (1949) (those employees not protected by unions require other
protective devices). See note 50 supra.
52. Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 536-37 (1949).

53. Id.
54. For Illinois legislation, see note 12 supra. See also ALASKA STAT.

§ 18.80.220 (1977); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420(a) (West Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN.
LAws. ch. 149, § 24K (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(2) (Supp. 1977);
Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 4.12.02(A) (Page 1978); R.I. GEN. LAws. ANN. § 28-5-7
(Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180 (Supp. 1977).
55. See generally Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dis-
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policy, the courts granted relief to at-will employees discharged
56
for refusing to commit peijury before a legislative committee,
rejecting a foreman's sexual advances, 57 and ffiling Workmen's
58
Compensation claims.
THE KELSAY OPINION
Proprietyof Precedent
In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,59 the Illinois Supreme Court
granted relief to a plaintiff who was discharged solely for having
filed a Workmen's Compensation claim.
The court cited two cases as authority conforming with the
public policy expressed in the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. 60 The first case, Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas
Co., 6 1 was founded upon two policy grounds: an Indiana statute
prohibiting the use of any device to relieve the employer of his
obligations to injured employees, 62 and an analogy between retaliatory discharge and retaliatory eviction in landlord-tenant
law. 63 The fear of retaliation for reporting violations of housing
codes inhibits such reporting, and is analogous to the fear of re64
taliatory discharge for filing a compensation claim.
missal: Timefor a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976). See also Blades, supra
note 33.
56. Petermann v. Teamster Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959). Cf. Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960)
(jury duty service proper grounds for discharge).
57. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974). See generally
A Right to Workmen's Compensation, supra note 24, at 478; A Common Law
Action, supra note 31 (comment on Monge). See also Geary v. United
States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (refusal to sell unsafe
pressure pipe); Roemer v. Zurich Ins. Co., 25 Ill. App. 3d 606, 323 N.E.2d 582
(1975) (secretary falsely accused plaintiff of making sexual advances); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271 (1975).
58. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.3d 978 (1975).
59. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
60. Id. at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
61. 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973).
62. Id. at 427-28. IND. CODE § 22-3-2-15 (1971) provides that: "No contract
or agreement, written or implied, no rule, regulation or other device shall, in
any manner, operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this Act" (emphasis added).
63. Although at the time of the Frampton decision, Indiana did not as
yet recognize the tort of retaliatory eviction, the court cited several other
jurisdictions in support of its analogy, including Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d
687 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 90 Cal. Rptr.
729 (1970); Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1968).
64. Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 429 (Ind. 1973).
The Framptoncourt announced the public policy as follows: "[I] n order for
the goals of the [Workmen's Compensation] Act to be realized and for public policy to be effectuated, the employee must be able to exercise his right
in an unfettered fashion without being subject to reprisal." Frampton v.
Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1973).
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The Kelsay court disagreed with Motorola's argument that
Frampton was distinguishable because of the Indiana statute.
Presumably, the Kelsay majority relied on the subsequently enacted criminal provision for retaliatory discharge as support for
public policy.6 5 Kelsay made no mention of the retaliatory eviction analogy, although an Illinois statute existed declaring retaliatory evictions violative of public policy. 66 Instead, the court
maintained that the overriding principle of Indiana's public policy applied equally to injured employees in Illinois.67
The second case cited by Kelsay was Sventko v. Kroger
Company,68 wherein a Michigan court also used public policy as
the basis for recognizing retaliatory discharge. 69 That state's
legislature had not included prohibitions against discharge in its
Workmen's Compensation Act.70 Instead, Sventko relied on
Frampton for recognition of the expansion of public policy in
the workmen's compensation area.
The fallacy of Kelsay's reliance on Framptonand Sventko is
in its "snowball" effect. While the Frampton court in part justified its recognition of retaliatory discharge by the language of its
state statute, the Sventko court relied not on a statute but rather
on the Frampton opinion. In turn, Kelsay's reliance on these
decisions snowballed. While the Kelsay court may have felt justifled in relying on those cases, in reality it did no more than
approve of the Indiana statute.
The Kelsay dissent maintained that the majority's opinion
constituted judicial legislation, 7 ' finding support in Loucks v.
Star City Glass Company.72 The Loucks case presented the
question of whether Illinois should recognize an action for retaliatory discharge in the workmen's compensation area. The Seventh Circuit held on appeal that in the absence of legislative
action it would not recognize such an action, 73 and that the
65. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 358-59.

66. The Illinois legislature has enacted a retaliatory eviction statute:

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (1977).

"Retaliatory eviction is the forced ejectment of a tenant in response to
the tenant's complaint to a governmental authority of a housing code of
similar regulatory violation." See Note, Retaliatory Eviction: The Unsolve!
Problem-Clorev. Fredman,25 DEPAuL L. REv. 522 n.1 (1976).
67. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IlM. 2d at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
68. 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976).
69. Id.
70. Id.

71. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., at 74 l. 2d at 193, 384 N.E.2d at 362-63.
72. 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977).
73. Id. at 749.
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proper functions of a court did not include legislative activism.

74

The Kelsay majority dismissed this deliberate refusal of the
Loucks court to engage in legislation. 75 In contrast, the Kelsay
dissent stressed the significance of the 1975 amendment to the

Workmen's Compensation Act, which made it a criminal offense
for an employer to threaten or effect a discharge in retaliation
for a claim. The dissent reasoned that the legislature intended
the criminal sanctions to constitute a sufficient deterrent. Had a
civil remedy been considered necessary, the legislature would
76
have incorporated such a provision.
The General Assembly's enactment of a criminal statute regarding retaliatory discharges is significant in that the legisla-

ture has recognized its function of providing such sanctions.
Pragmatically, however, further legislative reform in the form of

a civil remedy is unlikely. An excellent example of a similarly
impotent statute is the Illinois retaliatory eviction statute 77 declaring such evictions to be against public policy. That statute
has been characterized as "toothless." 78 The same may be said
of the criminal provision for retaliatory discharge. Although the

statute provides for a maximum fine of $500.00,79 it cannot logically be said that the threatened payment of such a sum is a
74. Id. See, e.g., Steinberg, The FederalEmployers' LiabilityAct and Judicial Activism: Policymaking by the Courts, 12 WILLAMETrE L.J. 79 (1975).
75. It is interesting to note that the Seventh Circuit in Loucks just as
readily refused to abstain, pending determination of whether the cause of
action should be recognized in Illinois by that state's highest court. Although the Seventh Circuit was aware of the Kelsay trial court verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, it decided not to await final determination by a state
tribunal. Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745, 746 n.1 (1977).
76. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 III. 2d at 193, 384 N.E.2d at 362. The Illinois Constitution clearly provides for separation of powers: "[t] he legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise
powers properly belonging to another." ILL.CONST. art. H1, § 1 (1970).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (1977).
78. MODEL RESIDEN'TrL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE 70 (1969), cited in
Note, Retaliatory Eviction: The Unsolved Problem-Clore v. Fredman, 25
DEPAuL L. REV. 522, 529 (1976).
79. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.26 (1977) and ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-1-17 (1977). The criminal sanctions provided by the General Assembly are "toothless" for several reasons. In order for anyone to become
aware of an employer's violation-threat of discharge, for example-the employee would have to make public the threat. If the employee had preferred
to keep the job, he would certainly remain silent, rather than report the
violation.
Moreover, the Attorney General's and State's Attorneys' offices of Illinois enforce these provisions only upon the request of the Industrial Commission. Thus, an employee wrongfully discharged would first have to
report to the Commission and convince the Commission to persuade the
Attorney General or State's Attorney to act against the employer. The cumulative effect of these efforts is a $500.00 fine imposed on the employer.
Brief for Amicus Curiae at 10, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384
N.E.2d 353 (1978).
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sufficient deterrent to any large, financially stable employer who
intends to discharge his employees. Thus, the criminal provision for retaliatory discharge is without potency or force. Furthermore, the criminal sanction enriches the state. Civil
sanctions, however, compensate the plaintiff for damages suffered. The Kelsay majority recognized this distinction and independently added "teeth" to the criminal provisions.8 0
The Kelsay dissent is implicitly supported by a decision it
did not cite. In Martinv. Tapley,81 the Alabama Supreme Court
recently refused to circumvent the terminable-at-will doctrine.
Martin involved a retaliatory discharge action wherein the
plaintiff alleged that his discharge was the result of having filed
a compensation claim. This case supports the Kelsay dissent in
that the Alabama court declined to expand the application 8of
2
that state's compensation act, even on public policy grounds.
Public Policy and Workmen's Compensation
In light of the origin of the terminable-at-will doctrine, the
decision of the Kelsay court to carve out an exception in the
workmen's compensation area is clearly justifiable. As previously mentioned, the doctrine originated in the courts. 83 Therefore, the courts should be fully entitled to erode the doctrine or
abrogate it entirely. Additionally, the doctrine arose because of
the economic conditions and concomitant public policy of the
early twentieth century. As economic conditions have changed,
80. The court had refused to give "teeth" to an age discrimination suit,

brought on the basis of the Age Discrimination Act, which in pertinent part

provides that "[t] he right to employment otherwise lawful without discrim-

ination because of age, where the reasonable demands of the position do
not require such an age distinction, is hereby recognized as and declared to
be a right of all the people of the State which shall be protected as provided
herein." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 881(c) (1977) (emphasis added). Teale v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. 2d 1, 359 N.E.2d 473 (1976).
The Illinois Workmen's Compensation exclusivity provision states that:
'The compensation herein provided, together with the provision of this Act
shall be the measure of the responsibility of any employer engaged in any
of the enterprises or businesses enumerated ... ." LL..REV. STAT. ch. 48,
§ 138.11 (1977).
However, the Workmen's Compensation Act provides for a right, sepa-

rate and independent of the job itself. That is, while the Workmen's Com-

pensation Act involves primarily compensation for work-related injuries,

the Age Discrimination Act involves merely ages, and discrimination on the
job as a result of age. In this respect, Teale and Kelsay are distinguishable.
Workmen's compensation is a separate and distinct right, statutorily imposed on the employer as a liability, and guaranteed to the employees. Age
is not a separate and distinct "right" in terms of statutory protection.

81. 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978).
82. Id.
83. See notes 8-10 supra. See also notes 29-41 and accompanying text
supra.
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so have social policies.

84

Social change involves identification of a problem and an attempt to resolve that problem.8 5 Public policy is the legal instrument for recognizing social change.8 6 Thus, the use of public
policy by the Kelsay court was necessary to implement this exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine. When society has
changed its approach to a problem, the law, by definition, has no
precedent for recognizing and adopting the change in values.
The use of public policy, therefore, is needed to permit legal
precedent to be made and justified.
The Kelsay court condemned retaliatory discharge as offensive to the public policy of Illinois as stated in the Workmen's

Compensation Act.8 7 It characterized the Act as having the hu84. Friedman and Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial
Accidents, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 50, 51 (1967).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. In a similar vein, the Illinois Supreme Court has acknowledged that
courts recognize change in society's values without the benefit of legal precedent. Justice Dooley, in his concurring opinion in the recent case of Renslow v. Mennonite Hospitalaptly stated: "Obviously, the courts create law.
If it were otherwise the common law would be out of touch with life as is a
corpse. Courts must take an active part in the development of common law,
although this may mean creativeness." 67 Ill. 2d 348, 361, 367 N.E.2d 1250,
1257 (1977) (cited in Brief for Appellant at 16, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 111.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978)). See Note, Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital:
PrenatalInjuries and A Pre-Existence Duty, 10 J. MAR. J. 417 (1977).
The plaintiff, while before the Illinois Supreme Court, relied heavily on
the argument of public policy. In characterizing the retaliatory discharge
action as one sounding in tort, the brief expanded its discussion to other
areas of law where the master-servant relationship did not bar suit by the
latter against the former i.e. libel, slander, etc. Further arguments were
presented stressing the independent nature of the retaliatory discharge
cause of action, and in support of recognition thereof, the Brief for Appellant cited at page 3 the case of Marchlik v. Cornet Ins. Co., 40 Ill. 2d 327, 332,
239 N.E.2d 799, 802 (1968); "Public policy has been defined as judicial decisions, legislation, and constitutions, as well as customs, morals, and notions
of justice which may prevail within the state."
The Kelsay court implicitly determined that it, as the Supreme Court of
Illinois, was the only route of recourse left available to the employees. In
fact, it is commendable that the General Assembly has acted at all. No
strong lobby supports the employees effectively. Employees lack cohesiveness, apart from union activities, in their attempts to influence the General
Assembly, because of the diverse nature of their employments and demands. Finally, strong interest groups do exist which would predictably oppose further, more potent legislation. Therefore, the close and yet impartial
contact the courts maintain with society and its changing demands does
lend support to judicial innovation.
See generally Blades, supra note 33, at 1433-35, and authorities cited
therein. Cf. Summers, supra note 8.
It is interesting to note that the Illinois Supreme Court has historically
been very protective of the Workmen's Compensation Act. At the same
time, it has been loath to restrict its applicability; in fact, the court has been
known to expand the Act, with some startling results. For illustration, the
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mane and beneficial purpose of providing employees with a remedy for work-related injuries. 88 To permit employers to force
employees to choose between their jobs and compensation for
injuries, the court reasoned, is untenable and contrary to the
public policy expressed in the Act. 89
case of Allen-Garcia Co. v. IndustrialComm'n, 334 M1.390, 166 N.E. 78 (1929),
first introduced the doctrine of the loaned servant in the workmen's compensation area. Although the Act at the time did not include a provision
regarding the status of these workers' claims, the court interpreted the
then-existing statute so as to provide coverage for the loaned servant.
Thereafter, Allen-Garcia met with state-wide disapproval, yet courts cited
it as support on numerous occasions. The doctrine resulted in more litigation, as the opinion in Allen-Garcia made it unclear which employer was
liable to pay compensation in the event of an injury.
The startling result of this case is that the General Assembly eventually
adopted the court's initiative portrayed in Allen-Garcia, and in 1963, enacted an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act which provided
for the loaned-servant. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1(b) (2) (1977), which
includes as covered those employees not in the usual course of their employment, but there at the lawful direction or instruction of their employers.
See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1(a) (4) (1977) (borrowing employer is
primarily liable).

For other early examples of judicial activism in the employment area,
see Union Asbestos & Rubber Co. v. Industrial Comm'n., 415 Ill. 367, 114
N.E.2d 345 (1953); Franklin County Coal Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 398 Ill.
528, 76 N.E.2d 457 (1947).

88. As said by dissenting Chief Justice T.E. Brennan in Whetro v.
Awkerman, 383 Mich. 235, 249, 174 N.W.2d 783, 787 (1970):

The function of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to place the
financial burden of industrial injuries upon the industries themselves,
and spread that cost ultimately among the consumers.
This humane legislation was developed because the industrialization had left in its wake a trail of broken bodies.
Employers were absolved from general liability for negligence in
exchange for the imposition of more certain liability under the Act.
See also Fisher Body Div., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 40 Ill. 2d
514, 240 N.E.2d 694 (1968) (purpose of Act is to protect employees against
risks and hazards peculiar to nature of work they are employed to do);
O'Brien v. Rautenbush, 10 Ml. 2d 167, 139 N.E.2d 222 (1956) (burden of caring
for casualties of industry should be borne by the industry, not the individual); Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 2 IlL 2d 590, 119 N.E.2d 224 (1954)
(same).
89. The court in Kelsay was obviously concerned about the coercion
employed by Motorola. It is relatively simple to envision the scenarios the
decision was intended to prohibit: An employee P, of a low-income bracket,
is injured while working at employer D's facility. P files the compensation
claim, and D's management orders P to drop the claim, or face the risk of
being fired. P may then either- 1) do as ordered, and drop the claim, or 2)
refuse, and consequently, lose the job. In the first situation, D has effectively saved the expenses normally involved in litigation before the Industrial Commission. D might pay a small sum to P for placating purposes, or
might not. In any event, D has effectively avoided the statutory liability

imposed, in contravention of the public policy embodied in the compensation act.
In the second situation-that involved in Kelsay-while the employer
is not successful in avoiding liability for the injury to the employee, he nevertheless gets revenge. Moreover, it is likely the employer persists in hop-
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The policy embodied in the Act recognizes that over the

ing that threats of discharge will have the results described in the first
situation, up until the moment when discharge actually occurs. Finally, it is
probable that many employees, faced with the choice of a job lost, or payment of several thousand dollars worth of medical bills, would prefer the
latter. That "choice" for the employee contravenes the underlying purpose
of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
There is no recorded documentation available as to whether retaliatory
discharge for filing compensation claims is a general practice among employers. With the Kelsay decision, of course, no Illinois employer will admit to such practices in the future. It is possible to assume that retaliatory
discharge in this situation is not common. The novelty of this action in the
United States lends credence to this assumption; with Kelsay, only ten
state cases have discussed this precise issue. See note 14 supra.
However, the very scarcity of decisions favorable to the employees in
this specific area equally supports the converse proposition. As a practical
matter, before Kelsay, the state of the law regarding the traditional terminable-at-will employment relationship and Workmen's Compensation was
insurmountable. Those employees most commonly filing compensation
claims are blue collar workers; they are most frequently in contact with industrial areas and machinery, most commonly leading to on-the-job injury.
They are of limited financial means, ordinarily. Attorneys' fees are prohibitive, and more importantly, the attorneys themselves for the most part
would prefer sure collection of fees to the non-pecuniary award of a difficult
battle perhaps lost.
According to the docket books of the Illinois Industrial Commission, the
number of filed cases (cases in which disputes have arisen, by definition
(ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.19 (1977)) are as follows:
1950
15,168
1955
21,037
1960
25,218
1965
29,256
1970
34,699
1971
34,663
1972
34,624
1973
38,846
1974
40,290
1975
40,117
1976
48,189
1977
57,484
The above figures are reprinted in Stevenson, The Illinois Workmen's Compensation System: A Description and Critique,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 675, 678
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Stevenson]. Mr. Stevenson hypothesizes that
the increase of persons employed in Illinois over these years does not account for the increase in disputed claims. Rather, it is his belief that the
factors causing the marked increase are: 1) increased awareness of legal
rights, 2) increased activity on the part of unions, lawyers, doctors or others,
and 3) increased benefits. A caveat must be made with respect to the second factor, however. The extent of union activity in the workmen's compensation area is, in Stevenson's words, "little more than a lawyer referral
service. Frequently, the union fills out the application and the attorney
never meets his client until the day of the hearing." Id. at 680. See also
Parrish, Workmen's Compensation Law in Illinois: Some Economic Consequences of Recent Changes, 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 715 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Parrish]. As a result of the 1975 amendments to the Act, Illinois benefits
are now the highest of the fifty states in nearly all categories. A survey
conducted in 1977 of the 8,000 members of the Illinois Manufacturers' Association resulted in about 700 respondents, with the following results. Their
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years, society has altered its hierarchy of values.90 Industrialization and the safeguarding of the employer's interests, once
paramount in importance to society, has given way to individualism and protection of employees. Accordingly, public policy is
a proper vehicle for creating this exception to the terminable-atwill doctrine. The exception protects the integrity of the workmen's compensation laws.9 1
Retaliatory Discharge as a Tort
The Kelsay majority characterized the retaliatory discharge
exception as a tort.9 2 A distinction was made between liability
under the Workmen's Compensation Act and liability for this
tort. The Act compensates employees for physical work-related
injuries. The tort action, however, imposes liability on the employer for a retaliatory discharge and provides compensation to
the employee for lost wages. 93 The court did not characterize
the type of tort action recognized.
Analogies have been drawn between retaliatory discharge
and abuse of process" as well as prima facie tort.95 The tort of
responses show that workmen's compensation costs rose from $34 million

in 1974 to nearly $156 million in 1977. That is an increase of 357% in three
years. Id. at 722.
90. Compare notes 29-43 with 54-58 and accompanying text supra.
91. See note 89 supra.
92. It can be said that the characterization of retaliatory discharge as a
tort is a landmark in itself. Neither Frampton nor Sventko determined
what type of action retaliatory discharge was. But see Aikens v. Wisconsin,
195 U.S. 194 (1904) (discussion of prima facie intentional infliction of temporal damages); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 511 (Ore. 1975) (tort action recognized
for discharge because of service of jury duty); Brown, The Rise and
Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort Principle,54 Nw. U. L.REV. 563
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Brown].
The Kelsay case was for the purpose of non-comittalism, an excellent
vehicle for creating a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. As previously stated, it was clear that the sole reason for Kelsay's discharge was
retaliation for filing the claim. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
The Illinois Supreme Court was thus able to leave to lower courts in future
decisions the further development of this tort.
93. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d at 183, 384 N.E.2d at 360.
As previously noted, only two state courts had recognized a civil action
for retaliatory discharge in the workmen's compensation area at the time of
the Kelsay decision. This action was indeed novel. Its resolution in favor of
the plaintiff was even more remarkable. Compare, however, the statement
of Professor Larson, who presumably had in mind the history of the terminable-at-will doctrine, and more importantly, its erosion: "It is odd that

such a decision was so long in coming." 2 A.A.
PENSATON § 68.36 (Supp. 1978).

LARSON, WORKMEN'S COM-

94. See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 856; Blades, supra note 33, at 1423.
95. Blades, supranote 33, at 1422-23. See Brown, supra note 92; Holmes,
Privilege,Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894). The classic language
used to express the concept of prima facie tort is as follows: "Now intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to
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retaliatory discharge in the workmen's compensation area, however, is unique. The discharged employee seeks to exercise his
rights under the Workmen's Compensation Act by filing a claim.
The right to pursue that claim, an element not present in other
retaliatory discharge cases, can be characterized as a legally
protected property interest.96 Retaliatory discharge can thus be
described as an intentional interference with a legally protected

property interest. 97 The interference applies to the duress exerdamage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person's
property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse." Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow &Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (C.A. 1889). In
fact, the Kelsay plaintiff stated:
The employee does not ask this court to establish a new tort category
labeled prima facie tort, but rather requests this court to join a unified
national trend of authority that has recognized that a remedy should lie
for situations where the plaintiff suffers harm which the community
would conclude should be compensated because of the conduct of the
defendant.
Brief for Appellant at 9, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 M1.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1978).
Other theories of retaliatory discharge characterization have been propounded as well. The most notable is the tort of interference with contractual relations. Although it was once normally applied to the liability of
labor unions in calling strikes, such theory has largely been abrogated by
statute. PROSSER, supranote 3, at 946-47. Such theory is not readily applicable to the terminable-at-will employee discharged for filing a compensation
claim, precisely because that employee has no contract with his employer,
and no right to the job.
Compare, however, the view that an employee has a legally protected
right to his job. This assumption leads to the approach that the burden is
on the employer, not the discharged employee, to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the employee should be deprived of his job rights. Concomitantly, the employee's most valuable asset is his job. This approach
has been espoused by several writers. E.g., E. GINGBERG & I.BERG, DEMOCRATrC VALUES AND THE RIGHTS OF MANAGEMENT ch. 11 (1963); Summers,
supra note 8.
It has been said that:
There was a time when a worker's job was a thing of the hour; he could
be hired or fired at will, and his only right was to be paid for the hour he
worked. Today, the job has become a thing of value.... IT]he worker
has come to have what might be called a property right in his job. His
wages and benefits generally accrue with seniority, which increases the
value of his job as time goes on .... Like any other property holder in
our free, democratic society, he cannot be deprived of his rights except
by due process.
Braden, From Conflict to Cooperation,in PROCEEDINGS TO THE SixTH ANNUAL LABOR RELATIONS CONFERENCE

43 (Inst. of Indus. Rel., W. Va. Univ.,

1956).
96. See notes 2-10 and accompanying text supra, regarding the exchange of rights and liabilities as the result of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 871, at 61
(Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976). One who intentionally deprives another of his
legally protected property interest or causes injury to the interest is therefore subject to liability to the other if his conduct is culpable and not justifiable. Although this tort is phrased as one of "deprivation," the comments to

19791

Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.

cised by the employer in forcing the employee to choose between his job and the compensation claim.98
Notwithstanding the novelty of this tort, certain circumstances should guarantee to future plaintiffs a cause of action.
These can be enumerated as follows: an employer-employee relationship, injury to the employee in the course of employment,
compensation claim filed by the employee, threat of discharge
by employer for employee's refusal to withdraw claim, refusal
by employee to withdraw claim, discharge of employee and
damages (lost wages). 99
Damagesfor Retaliatory Discharge
Compensatory Damages
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's award
of $749.00 compensatory damages. 10 0 This amount represented
the wages that Kelsay would have earned from the time she was
fired until the time she found a new job. 10 1 In affirming the
award, the court implicitly recognized that it was incumbent
upon a discharged employee to seek other employment in miti10 2
gation of damages.
it cover invasion as well. Such a tort would cover the acts of the employer,
whether tney result in a fired employee, or an employee minus the compensation act benefits. The American Law Institute characterizes this tort as
one covering a wide range of the general tort principles.
98. Duress, as defined by the American Law Institute, is a threat of unlawful conduct which is intended to prevent and which does prevent another from exercising free will and judgment in his conduct. Courts
originally restricted the use of duress to imprisonments, mayhem, fear of
loss of life, etc. These boundaries have been gradually relaxed. Id. at 66.
Acts or threats can be considered to be duress only if they are unlawful.
That element of the tort is satisfied by the Illinois criminal provision for
retaliatory discharge. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-1-17 (1977).
This characterization is tenuous, however. First, "interference" suggests that mere threat of discharge would be sufficient. Although Kelsay
involved a discharge, language in the majority's opinion suggests that
threats alone would suffice.
Second, the compensation claim can be characterized as a mere expectancy of monetary relief, rather than a property interest. This problem can
be reconciled by the fact that an injured worker's sole recourse against his
employee for work-related injuries is the right to fie the claim. More properly, then, the "property interest" element is that right to pursue the claim,
and not necessarily the right to receive the amounts claimed.
99. However, to tenuously list the elements of the tort is to do no more
than restate the facts. In light of the difficulty in characterizing the tort itself, it is no wonder that the Kelsay court refrained from enumerating the
elements of this elusive tort action. See notes 94-98 supra.
100. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d at 190, 384 N.E.2d at 361.
101. Id. at 178; 384 N.E.2d at 355.
102. In Hill v. Bell Discount Corp., 39 Ill. App. 2d 426, 188 N.E.2d 517
(1963), the plaintiff was discharged in July, 1959 from his employment as a
tractor operator due to the defendant's unlawful use of wage assignment.
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However, discharge in the workmen's compensation area is
unique in that the plaintiff has suffered a physical injury prior to
the discharge. That injury may interfere with the plaintiff's ability to seek other employment, especially when the injury is of a
serious nature. The courts will have to consider the extent of
injury in the issue of mitigation. Obviously, if the plaintiff is incapacitated for a period of time, the plaintiff cannot be expected
to seek other employment.
Punitive Damages
The court conceded that punitive damages are generally not
recoverable for wrongful discharge. Actions for discharge based
on a theory of breach of contract do not give rise to claims for
punitive damages. 10 3 The court distinguished its decision to allow punitive damages for cases subsequent to Kelsay by
stressing that retaliatory discharge is a tort action.10 Characterization of retaliatory discharge as a tort is significant because it
1 05
affords plaintiffs the opportunity to seek punitive damages.
The purpose of awarding punitive damages in Illinois is twofold: to punish and to deter.10 6 That same purpose is also the
basis of criminal punishment. Therefore, the Kelsay court implicitly determined that the criminal provision in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 10 7 standing alone, was insufficient,
and added the element of punitive damages as further deterrent.
In the instant case, the defendant had no warning of the impropriety in firing Kelsay. Consequently, the court refused to impose punitive damages for an act previously considered
08
rightful.
He remained unemployed until January, 1962. The court found that the
plaintiff made insufficient efforts during that period to seek other employment, and that he was under a duty to minimize his damages. See Annot.,
44 A.L.R.3d 629 (1972).
103. See generally notes 32-41 and accompanying text supra.
104. See, e.g., Raley v. Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59
S.E.2d 148 (1950) (court held that no cause of action was stated, because

plaintiff did not allege breach of contract as grounds for the discharge).

105. McKillip, Punitive Damages in Illinois: Review and Reappraisal,27
DE PAUL L. REV. 571, 572 (1978) [hereinafter cited as McKillip]; C. McCORMICK, DAMAGES (1935).
106. See generally McKillip, supra note 105.

107. The court did not consider the maxim: Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4(h) (1975); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1005-9-1(4) (1975).

108. As grounds for inferring that a civil action may exist for a violation
of a criminal statute, the court cited the case of Heimgaertner v. Benjamin
Elec. Mfg. Co., 6 ]M. 2d 152, 128 N.E.2d 691 (1955). Heimgaertnerinvolved a
criminal statute for withholding wages of employees who left work to vote.

There, the court announced that a violation of a statute may result in civil
as well as criminal liability, even though the former is not specifically men-
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IMPLICATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS

It was clear in Kelsay that the employer's sole motive was
retaliation. Evidence had been admitted that Kelsay was a good
worker, with no complaints about the quality of her work. 10 9
However, future cases may not be so manifestly retaliatory.
Thus, the problem will be whether retaliation must be shown to
be the sole motive in discharge, or whether lesser standards
shall suffice, such as dominant, mixed or even partial motive." 0
Another complication is the extent to which future courts
will extend this declaration of public policy. Public policy may
be such that the ex-employee's right to file a compensation
claim should be absolute. If so, any coercive device or interference with the filing of the claim might be actionable in the future. Although a narrow reading of the Kelsay case limits
actions to those for discharge, a broader application may include
actions for demotions, undesirable transfers, shift changes and
other coercive devices available to the employer. Mere threat of
discharge, and in the alternative, discharge without notice to the
employee of the employer's policy, may be sufficient to constitute a violation of public policy. This reasoning is supported by
language in Kelsay regarding threats of discharge as undermining the public policy embodied in the compensation act."' Because of the strong statement of public policy announced by the
Kelsay court, it is likely that the courts will move to enforce em2
ployees' rights whenever feasible."
tioned. However, the Kelsay court neglected to state that this was dicta;
Heimgaertner held the statute itself unconstitutional. See also Boyer v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 38 Ill. 2d 31, 230 N.E.2d 173 (1973).
The use of the term ex post facto, although a misnomer, adequately
represents the novelty of the action, as well as the punishment or lack
thereof, in Kelsay. In Illinois, ex postfacto laws are only those enacted by
statute, and then, only of a criminal, not civil, nature. Even so, the Kelsay
court refused to impose a civil version here. See People ex. rel. County Collector of Ogle Co. v. Chicago, B. & 0. R.R. Co., 323 Ill. 536, 154 N.E.2d 468
(1926).
The Kelsay court did rely on the decision of Nees v. Hocks, 272 Ore. 210,
536 P.2d 512 (1975). In that case, punitive damages were not awarded in a
novel action where the firing was the result of the employee's service of jury
duty. It was determined that future plaintiffs would have available punitive
damages.
109. Brief for Appellant at 6, Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384
N.E.2d 353 (1978).

110. Cases involving discharge of employees for union activities utilize a
variety of standards in determining whether the employer's motive in firing
was wrongful. See, e.g., NLRB v. George J. Roberts &Sons, Inc., 451 F.2d 941
(2nd Cir. 1971) ("partial motivation" is sufficient to construe violation of National Labor Relations Act); NLRB v. Pioneer Plastics Corp., 379 F.2d 301
(1st Cir. 1967) ("dominant motive" test used).
111. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
112. Nor do any defenses seem readily available to the employers. Cf.
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CONCLUSION

For Marilyn Kelsay, this case was a moral-not a pecuniary-victory. For employees in the future, the tort of retaliatory
discharge may be a windfall. A minor injury at work may result
in "constructive tenure" for an employee whose employer is
fearful of discharging a potentially litigious worker. In the alternative, an ex-employee may recover a windfall of punitive damages awarded by a sympathetic jury.
It is likely that an employee who apprehends imminent discharge will fie a frivolous compensation claim in order to prevent discharge. The more ruthless employee may even consider
self-inflicted injuries in order to keep a job. However, a finding
by the court that the claim was fraudulent and groundless
should justify a denial of recovery in the independent tort ac11 3
tion.
Employers may react unfavorably to Kelsay, and leave the
unfriendly business climate of Illinois. 114 New firms may be discouraged from locating here. 115 While employees' rights are being protected, employers are gaining nothing. Instead, they
have lost the most powerful device available to them-that of
the right to fire-albeit in a limited area. No relief to the employers is foreseeable. In fact, further erosion of the terminableat-will doctrine is likely.
That is not to say, however, that erosion of the doctrine is
without merit. Particularly in the area of workmen's compensation, commanding public policy arguments can and have been
made, as evidenced by the Kelsay opinion. While public policy
substitutes for legal precedent, public policy realistically serves
as a vehicle for incorporating the cognizance of a problem and
its resolution. Although the prevalence of the discharge problem in retaliation for filing compensation claims was not at issue, the Kelsay court implicitly found it sufficiently egregious to
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151, 154 (1976) where
concurring Judge Allen made additional comments which he felt would be
helpful in the future. There, the plaintiff had suffered a low back injury
which had a high probability of reoccurrence, for which she had fied a compensation claim. She was then discharged. Judge Allen was of the opinion
that the equally plausible alternative explanation would not be actionable.

That is, employers are within their rights to not retain "accident-prone" employees. Thus, the use of "accident prone" discharge may constitute a viable defense.

113. See, e.g., Ilm. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 41 (1977).
114. Parrish, supra note 89, at 731. Mr. Parrish based his discussion of

the problem of fleeing industry on the rising costs of workmen's compensation benefits in Illinois.
115. Id. at 732.
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116
warrant resolution.

The most compelling aspect of Kelsay is the court's adamant refusal to permit employers to evade their legally imposed
liabilities under the compensation act through duress and coercion. The compelling purpose in Kelsay's moral victory against
the coercive tool of discharge judicially balances the inequities
in employment relationships. As a result of Kelsay, the creation
of a more equitable balance is a victory shared by all who have
felt the imbalance and inequity of being in the employ of another.
Elena Z. Kezelis

116. See note 89 supra.

